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     “From the genes, and perhaps from early childhood development 
as well, we obtain our basic sexual drive and preferences.  But how 
we translate these into actual behavior depends on social factors—
including opportunities, resources, and constraints.  Sex is a means to 
human ends, and the efficient fitting of means to ends, whether done 
consciously or unconsciously, is the economist’s notion of 
rationality.”1   
                              —Judge Richard A. Posner 
 
     “There exists in the mind a strong tendency towards the pleasure 
principle, but that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or 
circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in 
harmony with the tendency toward pleasure.”2   
                              —Sigmund Freud 
 
“Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, 
certain activities not because they harm others but because they are 
considered, in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., 
immoral.”3  
                              —Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
     “What is pornography to one man is the laughter of genius to another.”4 






                                                 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 436 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND 
REASON]. 
 2. TEODROS KIROS, SELF-CONSTRUCTION AND THE FORMATION OF HUMAN VALUES 105 
(1998) (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 4 (James Strachey ed., 
trans., 2d ed. 1961)). 
 3. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 4. D. H. LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND SO ON 11 (1936). 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
It is through zoning that rationality in land-use development is achieved and 
means are fitted to ends.  Indeed, the very justification for zoning has been to 
“separate incompatible uses of property.”5  In land-use regulation, a normative 
analysis of conduct—and, for purposes of this Article, sexual expression—is 
evaluated “by [its] practical consequences rather than by [its] conformity to 
moral, political, or religious ideas.”6  It is not possible to divorce a zoning plan 
altogether from these forces, however; nor can the Common Law be expected 
to be unreceptive to these forces in determining whether an action is, under the 
law of nuisance, an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of 
property and thus subject to abatement.7   
Ideally, then, an argument may be made that land-use regulations should 
show “rational adaptations to . . . social circumstances,”8 and, by doing so, 
these adaptations may be sustained as reasonable exercises of constitutional 
power.9  Consequently, to sustain zoning law that infringes upon a zone of 
protected liberties that are guaranteed by the Constitution as such, it must not 
only be drawn narrowly, but also must seek to further a governmental interest 
that is recognized as substantial.10  In crafting a zoning restriction, care must be 
taken to narrow the application of a restriction, simply because the more 
general the focus of a law, “the clumsier a tool for abuse” it becomes.11 
                                                 
 5. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1222, 1225 (2009); see also DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND 
USE 49 (5th ed. 2008) (providing a sample list of zoning districts that separate land into different 
zones based upon the permitted use of the land); JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS 
E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 23 (1998) (“The purposes of zoning 
were to segregate residential uses from more intensive uses of land such as industrial, and thereby 
to provide safer, more quiet areas for family life.”). 
 6. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 437. 
 7. See George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical Revisionist 
Theory of Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEV. L. REV. 658, 670 (1995) (discussing the cost-benefit 
analysis involved in determining the proper use of a reasonableness inquiry) [hereinafter Smith, 
Nuisance Law]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (defining public 
nuisance).  But see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 485, 524–25 (2010) (asserting that common law jurisdictions that do not follow the 
Restatement of Torts standards for determining nuisance actions are at fault for balancing 
“competing interests as they see fit, considering only ‘the needs of justice’ broadly defined”; there 
are, quite simply, neither definitive rules nor normative principles to guide courts in determining 
what interests are appropriate to consider when balancing occurs). 
 8. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 437. 
 9. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (stating that, when land-use regulations do not 
adapt to social circumstances, those regulations may prove unconstitutional). 
 10. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 63 (1981). 
 11. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 734 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. 
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The Common Law has always been seen as a system shaped by morality,12 
which, in turn, is viewed as a “body of imperfect generalizations expressed in 
terms of emotion.”13  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. has cautioned that, in order 
to seek truth in the law, it is better to omit emotion and, instead, “ask ourselves 
what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by fact 
accurately ascertained.”14 
No doubt, one of the fundamental (and imperfect) generalizations of the 
common law is that an unreasonable use of real property may be abated under 
the law of nuisance.15  Yet, the extent to which an action by one party causes 
an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property and is, 
thus, subject to restraint in equity through injunctive relief is exceedingly 
problematic.16  Endeavoring to determine what is unreasonable conduct is 
nothing short of navigating an “impenetrable jungle.”17 
Although over time the foundational meanings of nuisance have been shown 
to be quite durable,18 confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency resulting from its 
application19 are tied inextricably to the inherently subjective nature of 
ascertaining when conduct is so “unreasonable” as to be injurious.20  Because 
of these limitations, the law of nuisance has been said to be impracticable for 
application and use as a contemporary land-use control-device.21 
The constitutional underpinnings of the limitations on a state or local 
government’s ability to zone sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) lie in the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.22  Early American jurisprudence focused 
primarily on protecting religious communities in determining what material 
                                                 
 12. See Ronald J. Allen, Moral Choices, Moral Truth, and the Eighth Amendment, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 28 (2008) (indicating that morality will often be considered in 
judicial decision-making regardless of the issue before the court); Ronald Reagan, President of 
the U.S., Politics and Morality Are Inseparable (Aug. 23, 1984), in 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (1984) (acknowledging religion as the “bedrock of moral order”). 
 13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV 1 (1915), reprinted in 
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 117, 119 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 701–02 (illustrating the balancing inquiry 
courts conduct between the benefit of abatement and the cost to the defendant of abating the 
nuisance in order to achieve efficient use of resources). 
 16. Id. at 663–64. 
 17. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). 
 18. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 356 (1999). 
 19. Robert Elickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land 
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 720 (1973). 
 20. Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 701–02. 
 21. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 10–11 (questioning how well nuisance law serves as a 
land-control device when it must consider both the social value of the land and economic factors). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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could lawfully be regulated.23  In analyzing this content, the courts applied an 
evolving standard for what constituted obscenity and, therefore, non-protected 
speech.24  These early attempts at limiting obscenity focused on protection of 
churches and their messages and on protection from the harm that could result 
from anyone, young or old, coming into contact with obscene material.25 
In the 1950s, as the Supreme Court of the United States distanced itself from 
a protectionist test and adopted a community-based standard for defining 
obscenity;26 communities still sought to protect the public from unfettered 
access to pornography.27  Because pornography could no longer be assumed to 
fall into the obscene category28—and was therefore transformed into possibly 
protected speech29—municipalities enacted zoning laws that attempted to 
control the concentration of sexually oriented businesses in their jurisdictions 
for the protection of the public.30  The Court has endorsed these ordinances 
provided they are supported by factual findings to satisfy the “secondary 
effects” test, essentially protecting the community from other social ills by 
limiting access to SOBs.31  These ordinances are not restricting the distribution 
of non-obscene speech, but rather the location from which it may be done.32 
The tension between an obscenity standard that allows a community to 
decide what it finds acceptable and a zoning standard that allows a local 
government to restrict the location of non-obscene sexually oriented businesses 
must be resolved in favor of the zoning ordinances that prevent other social 
harms beyond the sexual content.  In other words, if communities can justify 
regulating the location of sexually oriented businesses based on factors such as 
crime or drug use, and not the sexual nature of the material distributed, those 
regulations must be upheld and enforced. 
                                                 
 23. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 251–52 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting different means through which communities have attempted to address 
sexually oriented businesses). 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
 29. See infra Part III.B; see also David D. Cole, Playing by Pornography Rules: The 
Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1994) (“Even where speech is not 
legally obscene, the Court permits the government to regulate ‘offensive’ sexual speech in ways 
that it could not regulate ‘offensive’ political speech.”). 
 30. See infra Part IV.C. 
 31. See infra Part IV.C. 
 32. See infra note 260 and accompanying text; see also Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, 
Validity of Ordinances Restricting Location of “Adult Entertainment” or Sex-Oriented 
Businesses, 10 A.L.R. 5TH 538, 555 (1993) (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence validating 
“zoning ordinances restricting the location of adult businesses” and “making it clear that adult 
entertainment businesses are subject to a municipality’s zoning power like other  
businesses . . . .”). 
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One purpose of this Article is to rebut the arguments that attempt to 
marginalize the utility of the law of nuisance in land-use control—and 
specifically its practical use in the regulation of sexually oriented businesses 
(SOBs).  This Article will proceed to demonstrate that the common law of 
nuisance, guided modernly by the Restatement (Second) of Torts33 and given 
new, broad, interpretative power through the use of the concept of “moral 
nuisance,”34 remains a strong tool, together with exclusionary zoning and 
business-licensing requirements, to contain the placement of SOBs and their 
operations. 
Part I investigates the nature of moral reasoning in judicial decision-making 
focusing on the extent to which moral values are intrinsic to legal reasoning.  
The Article undertakes a brief historical survey of the vectors of force in 
colonial America, which were crucial to the subsequent adoption of a value-
laden (normative) construct for shaping moral conduct.35  The extent to which 
state action is proper to set and enforce moral codes is explored through the 
works of John Stuart Mill36 and the twentieth-century debates of Patrick Devlin 
and H.L.A. Hart on the extent of liberty.37  These debates serve as a useful 
framework from which to consider how the American legal system continues 
to grapple with the very same issues of liberty and of responsibility enunciated 
by Mill in 1859.38  This analysis serves as a bridge to investigate the 
“immoral” and insidious nature of the promotion and distribution of obscenity 
and pornography through the practices of SOBs as well as in the new markets 
of cyberspace, which have made pornography a significant part of American 
culture.39 
Part II examines the common law doctrine of nuisance and probes the extent 
to which it continues as a useful construct for land-use development. 
In Part III of this Article, the evolution of the regulation of obscenity will be 
traced from its religious-based enactments in early-American history to the 
community-centered determinations that now govern what is defined as 
obscene.  Additionally, this section explores the underlying constitutional 
issues that control the modern test for obscenity.   
                                                 
 33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979) (listing factors to consider 
when determining the gravity of the harm caused by the nuisance and the utility of conduct that 
caused the nuisance). 
 34. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 267 (2001) 
(discussing a number of instances where the concept of moral nuisances has been used to combat 
situations normally abated as public nuisances).  Actions for anticipatory and aesthetic nuisance 
may also be control options to regulate SOBs.  See infra notes 172, 175. 
 35. See infra Part 1.A. 
 36. See infra Part 1.B. 
 37. See infra Part 1.C. 
 38. See infra Part 1.C. 
 39. See infra Part 1.D. 
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Part IV addresses the use of zoning regulations to control both the influx and 
the continued operation of non-obscene sexually oriented businesses in 
communities.  This Part also analyzes the combination of community-based 
obscenity standards and secondary-effects zoning standards.  This combination 
provides a potentially workable, but an uneven and geographically diverse 
standard for the operation of a sexually oriented business.   
This Article concludes by finding that, in reviewing zoning ordinances, 
courts will rarely hold that an SOB restriction is based on a motive to control 
the content of adult entertainment; rather, they will hold that these restrictions 
are content-neutral in order to give deference to local governments to establish 
zoning schemes in accordance with their police powers. 
I.  MORAL REASONING AND LEGAL JUDGMENTS 
Determining a firm and fair basis for moral judgments cannot be derived 
exclusively from moral theory.40  Even though this theory may be  
used—although limitedly—to serve as a foundation for some moral judgments, 
it simply “should not be used as a basis for legal judgments.”41  Any form of 
“moral subjectivism” must be eschewed in favor of “moral relevatism,” which 
acknowledges that there is no single criterion for testing whether a moral claim 
is valid.42  Rather, any determination made of the morality or immorality of 
conduct is situational and only relative to an individual’s personal standards of 
morality.43  The exigencies of life within each culture or community are 
determinative of the moral code that is structured within it,44 thus making 
morality truly a local issue and one that varies from community to 
community.45  Seeking to legislate a uniform moral code is therefore 
problematic.46 
                                                 
 40. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1637, 1639 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Problematics].  Posner subsequently developed these 
lectures into a book under the same title.  See RICHARD. A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (2002). 
 41. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1639; see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
268 (2d ed. 1994) (maintaining that there is no necessary or logical connection between the 
content of law and morality). 
 42. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1642–43. 
 43. Id. at 1643. 
 44. Id. at 1650; see also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 7–8 (1962) 
(discussing the differing views on laws against “injur[ing] public morals” in the United States and 
England) [hereinafter HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY]. 
 45. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650. 
 46. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 
534 (1987) (discussing the view that “we cannot legislate morality”).  Fletcher notes that, 
“[w]hile the prevailing view today treats law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, 
the Kantian view treats the two as distinct and nonintersecting.”  Id.  Equally as perplexing is 
determining the kind of benefit accruing, and to whom, when laws “track morality.”  Ray 
Jackendoff, The Natural Logic of Morals and of Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 405 (2009). 
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If morality is determined by the local environment,47 how broad does the 
concept of locality reach?  If the Tenth Amendment extends to states the right 
to regulate public health, safety, and morals of the individual state,48 then the 
legislature of each state has broad powers, virtually free from federal 
interference, to act as the moral authority for its citizens.  In theory, if a citizen 
disagrees with a state’s interpretation of his moral code, that citizen may leave 
that state and join citizens with similar moral beliefs, or, better yet, gather 
other citizens to effectuate change by convincing them that the state’s morals 
are incorrect and must be changed through the voting process.  In essence, this 
ability to regulate morals should also be extended to counties and local 
municipalities in order to maximize a person’s “moral liberty.”49 This view 
comports with Jean Jacques Rousseau’s ideal of the social contract under 
which citizens relinquish their own natural liberty in order to subject 
themselves to civil liberty, which, in turn, is limited by the general will.50 
Although moral reasoning and legal reasoning are acknowledged as subsets 
of normative reasoning,51 “legal questions can and should be answered without 
first being translated into moral questions, and without the aid of moral 
theory.”52  Granted, law surely supports a number of moral principles; yet, 
morality is not backed up by law.53  Indeed, in general, morality is not enforced 
by law.54  When moral issues are in conflict and are presented to the courts for 
legal resolution, a sophisticated judiciary should defer such matters to the 
legislative or political process for resolution.55 
                                                 
 47. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650 (“Every society, and every subculture 
within a society, past or present, has had a moral code, but a code shaped by the exigencies of life 
in that society or that subculture . . . .”). 
 48. See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”:  
Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 46 (2006) 
(discussing the power of local governments to regulate based on “that extremely broad power of 
government to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people that is reserved 
to the states in the federal Constitution”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 49. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 19 (1947) (“[W]e might add to 
the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty . . . .”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1649. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1694. 
 54. Id. at 1695; see also Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 711 (1995) (arguing that, although “law and social morality will constrain 
much of the same behavior[,] . . . this does not mean . . . that the law will enforce every aspect of 
morality that concerns preventing harm to others”). 
 55. Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1708. 
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A.  Shaping Moral Values in Early America 
Whether society has the right to use the law to enforce its moral judgments 
is a question of great historical moment and one of ongoing debate.56  Indeed, 
from the very formation of American society, colonial legislation sought to 
regulate morality,57 finding its basis for action in “a mixture of biblical and 
common law sources”58 together with the moral law manifested therefrom.59 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed in Democracy in America I that early 
legislators were concerned with more than just social order; they were also 
concerned with society’s morals.60  He stated, “The chief care of the legislators 
in this body of penal laws was the maintenance of orderly conduct and good 
morals in the community; thus they constantly invaded the domain of 
conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial 
censure.”61  Although de Tocqueville is personally critical of this legislation as 
being “discreditable to human reason,”62 he nonetheless recognized that early 
American legislation “admirably combined the spirit of religion and the spirit 
of liberty.”63  Thus, in early America, “the legal regulation of morality was 
striking . . . partly because of the extensive reliance on Scripture and partly 
because English law itself had religious sources.”64  Notably, the founders 
believed that man had a “fallen human nature,”65 and that there was a 
coordinate need to be guided by “republican virtue” if survival of the new 
American form of governance was to be assured.66 
Even though the harshness of early colonial penal law was mitigated by the 
time the United States was founded, “the laws of different states still prohibited 
a variety of moral offenses . . . includ[ing], for example, bigamy, adultery, 
fornication, sodomy, bestiality, gambling, drunkenness, Sabbath violations, 
blasphemy, and profanity.”67  Acts such as lewdness and public indecency 
were also recognized with limitations because states believed that such acts 
                                                 
 56. PATRICK A. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 131 (1965). 
 57. Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 
65, 69 (2000) (“In early America, the legitimacy of morals legislation was widely accepted.”). 
 58. Id. at 70. 
 59. Id. at 69–70. 
 60. 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 38 (Vintage Books 1990) (1945). 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 69 (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 60, at 39). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 71 (citing GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY 
MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 143–45 (1960)). 
 65. William A. Stanmeyer, Keeping the Constitutional Republic: Civic Virtue vs. 
Pornographic Attack, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 566 (1987) (internal quotation omitted) 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison)). 
 66. Id. at 566 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14, 18 (James Madison)). 
 67. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 71. 
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threatened the core of virtuous society.68  Notably, “[t]hese laws, for the most 
part, remained on the books, at least in some jurisdictions, for most of 
American history.”69 
B.  John Stuart Mill’s Legacy 
Although many issues related to law and morality have been debated over 
the course of American history, “[t]he power [of the government] to regulate 
morality remained a firmly established part of American law until well into the 
twentieth century.”70 The modern debate on whether it is legitimate for a 
government to enforce morality as an end in itself was a revival of the debate 
that John Stuart Mill began in his 1859 essay, “On Liberty.”71 
In this essay, Mill set forth the principle that the government’s right to 
regulate morality is restricted to those individual behaviors that cause harm to 
others.72  Mill believed that the government should not have the power to 
punish individuals simply because others believe their behavior is immoral.73  
Specifically, he stated 
     [t]hat the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He cannot rightfully be compelled 
to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it 
will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise or even right.74 
Mill also advocated for a broader principle of liberalism, one of harmless 
action, or as he put it, “liberty of tastes and pursuits . . . of doing as we like, 
subject to such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our 
fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong.”75  He believed that it was 
inconsistent with the principles of individual liberty to use the government to 
coerce the individual because “‘a person’s taste is as much his own peculiar 
                                                 
 68. Stanmeyer, supra note 65, at 573–74. 
 69. Wolfe, supra note 57, at 71. 
 70. Id. 
 71. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1999) 
(1859); Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police Power, 12 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 12 (1999). 
 72. MILL, supra note 71, at 13. 
 73. Id.; see also Ku, supra note 71, at 13. 
 74. MILL, supra note 71, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 16; see also THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 3 
(1983) (quoting MILL, supra note 71, at 16) (noting Mill’s discussion of “a general liberty of 
action”). 
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concern as his opinion or purse[,]’ and over one’s body and mind, the 
individual is the absolute sovereign.”76 
C.  Philosophical Interpretations and Judicial Constructs for Decision-Making 
On-going debate over Mill’s principle of liberalism has continued through 
the years and was revised notably in the twentieth century by two Englishmen, 
Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart.77  In 1958, British judge Sir Patrick  
Devlin—in response to calls for the statute regulating homosexuality and 
prostitution to be repealed—argued that “no separate sphere of merely private 
morality could be marked off as in principle outside the concern of the criminal 
law . . . [because] the health of a society rested on its firm adherence to a 
binding moral code,” which he thought must be subject to legal enforcement.78  
Soon after Devlin announced his position, British legal philosopher H.L.A. 
Hart, in his book, Law, Liberty, and Morality,79 entered the dispute arguing for 
a modern revision of Mill’s principle.80  
Those subscribing to the Millian principles—which H.L.A. Hart  
favored—advocate for acceptance of a nation of liberty in action even though 
the parameters of this ideal remain imprecise and, indeed, even contentious 
among its supporters.81  In essence, these Millians argue for adoption of a 
general, rather open-ended, principle which acknowledges that individuals 
should be free to act autonomously so long as their actions are not injurious to 
others.82  Even though nuanced in its application by varying factual situations, 
this position is anchored to the proposition that if an individual is legally 
competent, he is in the best position to assess and determine the morality of his 
own personal conduct.83  Hart was especially fearful of majoritarian power to 
                                                 
 76. Ku, supra note 71, at 13 (alteration in original) (quoting MILL, supra note 71, at 103); 
see Todd E. Pettys, Sodom’s Shadow: The Uncertain Line Between Public and Private Morality, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1199 (2010) (discussing the difficulties in determining standards for 
distinguishing between public and private morality).  In contemporary society, “[l]iberalism is 
often associated with a rejection of corporate authority in favor of individual autonomy and with a 
belief that important questions can be resolved by rational inquiry.”  KENT GREENAWALT, 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 21 (1988). 
 77. GREY, supra note 75, at 4–5. 
 78. Id. at 4.  “[H]istory shows that the loosening of moral bounds is often the first stage of 
disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it 
does to preserve its government and other essential institutions.”  DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 13. 
 79. A second book, or sequel to this book, was The Morality of the Criminal Law in which 
Hart maintains that conduct viewed as immoral by some is not a sufficient reason to criminalize 
conduct seen as homosexual.  See H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1965). 
 80. GREY, supra note 75, at 5; see HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44. 
 81. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44, at 11. 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
 83. Ku, supra note 71, at 13. 
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impose upon the minority, through the law, its uncontested view of  
morality—particularly when questioned actions were not harmful to others.84 
Arguing to the contrary, supporters of the Devlin philosophy maintain that 
when deciding whether the government has a right to regulate morality, an ad 
hoc analysis must be undertaken which, of necessity, includes a consideration 
of all circumstances rather than one a priori principle.85  Thus, instead of 
advocating a general principle for governing the law’s right to regulate 
morality, the Devlinites argue simply that each piece of “morals legislation is 
an open-ended matter of policy to be decided by weighing all factors that might 
seem relevant in the circumstances.”86  For Devlin, himself, popular 
morality—as shaped by the responses of a reasonable man, although accepted 
as commonly held views—was not necessarily derived from objective reason, 
but could be drawn from subjective values and beliefs.87  Under this view, 
then, if society believed a certain conduct to be “so abominable that its mere 
presence [was] an offence,” this would be a proper basis for legal prohibitions 
to be set in law.88 
Although this debate over the continuing power of the government to 
regulate morality was raised initially within the context of democratic theory 
and moral philosophy, it soon touched the formation of law in the United 
States.89  Starting dramatically with the Warren Court, the fundamental right of 
the law to regulate morality began to be challenged constitutionally on the 
grounds of a newly created right to privacy.90 
Generally, judges during the twentieth century had—when considering 
issues of morality—either followed a judicial philosophy that precedent directs 
decision-making or, when confronting constitutional issues, that interpretations 
be guided by and reflect the moral conditions of society.91  Judges embracing 
                                                 
 84. See HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, supra note 44, at 77–78 (“[T]he greatest of 
the dangers . . . was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but 
that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they 
should do so.”).  Note also that the question of what constitutes “harm” has been the subject of 
rigorous debate.  GREY, supra note 75, at 13–14. 
 85. GREY, supra note 75, at 11. 
 86. Id. 
 87. DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 9, 15. 
 88. Id. at 17.  For example, in arguing for criminalizing homosexual sodomy, Devlin 
asserted that disgust cannot be ignored “if it is deeply felt and not manufactured.  Its presence is a 
good indication that the bounds of toleration are being reached.”  Id. 
 89. GREY, supra note 75, at 6. 
 90. Id. at 7; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1966) (holding that a “right to 
privacy” existed and was protected “by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”). 
 91. See Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and Perfectionist 
Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
233, 237–38 (2008). 
[T]raditional judges faced with resolving cases that present controversial moral issues 
would argue that their task as judges is to preserve the morality built into the law while 
refusing to enforce laws or promulgate rules of law that do not conform to that 
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the second philosophy often injected their personal standards of morality into 
opinions,92 which, in turn, determined a number of socially charged issues that, 
rightly or wrongly, have effected monumental social change in America.93  The 
extent to which the judicial temperament of the present century is either 
following that of the twentieth century or establishing new parameters for 
analysis and interpretation has yet to be established.94 
D.  Profiteering in Pornography 
It may be surprising to those that founded, in their perspective, a moral 
society that pornography is a thriving business in present-day America.  The 
pornography industry’s stock in trade is, quite simply, “fantasy,” which, 
depending upon the social and the political climate, can change dramatically.95  
The primary challenge that the industry must meet “is to identify and respond 
to often bewildering shifts in standards of sexual attractiveness.”96 
Although exact figures regarding the economic investment in the 
pornography industry in America are unknown,97 informed judgments 
                                                                                                                 
embedded morality, while judges who read the constitution morally would deny that 
the positive law is intrinsically moral and capable of resolving moral issues. 
Id. 
 92. Id. at 286–87. 
 93. Id. at 237–38, 282–83; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2–3, 11–12 (1967) 
(exhibiting judicial perspectives on race relations in a case concerning a ban on interracial 
marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954) (discussing race in the context 
of school segregation); see also Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical 
Context and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1455–56 (2003) (discussing how the Brown 
decision focused on individual rights and not the suffering of African Americans as a group). 
 94. See Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court Justices, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (May 12, 2008), http://politics.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/05/12/ranking-
the-politics-of-supreme-court-justices.html (noting that it is difficult, in some instances, to 
compare the current Supreme Court with the Court in previous decardes).  But see George P. 
Smith II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 93, 93 (2008) (“[T]he social constructs and legal tools necessary for the modern 
judiciary to meet head-on and deal with the contentious issues of bioethics and biotechnology are 
already in place.”). 
 95. FREDERICK S. LANE III, OBSCENE PROFITS: THE ENTREPRENEURS OF PORNOGRAPHY IN 
THE CYBER AGE 97 (2000). 
 96. Id.  Pornography allows men to play out sexual fantasies, which, in turn, bolsters an 
inflated sense of masculinity. See GAIL DINES, PORNLAND: HOW PORN HIJACKED OUR 
SEXUALITY xxvii (2010) (discussing pornographic scenes “as a vehicle to mark the feminine as 
all-powerless and the masculine as all-powerful”).  Additionally, one pornography actor, who is 
also a producer, expressed his belief that men expect the portrayal of violence against women in 
pornography.  Id. at xxvi, xxvii, 135. 
 97. This lack of exact figures is simply because the industry itself is seen as operating “as an 
underground market.”  Joe Knowles, X Factor: America Loves Its Smut, but Censors Say 
Enough’s Enough, REDEYE, May 14, 2004, at 8. 
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“estimate that porn generates at least $4 billion and perhaps as much as $12 
billion in annual revenues in the U.S. alone.”98 
1.  Regulating Immoral Conduct 
Statistics show that, since 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice has brought 
less than ten prosecutions for obscenity.99  This underscores the Department’s 
aversion to assuming aggressive leadership in this arena.100  Rather than 
prosecuting adult pornography—which is not illegal in itself, but can be 
prosecuted as obscenity under the Miller v. California precedent101—the policy 
of the Department has been directed toward combating child pornography and 
human trafficking.102 
2.  Second-Hand Smut 
Internet obscenity presents a particular challenge to enforcement efforts 
simply because “law enforcement seems not to have the time, resources or 
inclination to pursue it.”103  Since the Federal Communications Decency Act 
was held unconstitutional in 1997, federal support of actions to limit Internet 
speech has shifted to legislative efforts at the state and local levels and to 
                                                 
 98. Id.  This statistic positions the pornography industry as a bigger income-producing 
source in the American economy than the National Football League (estimated at $5 billion 
annually) and the National Basketball Association (estimated at $3 billion).  Id.  In 2006, the 
estimated value of the entire porn industry was set “around $96 billion,” with the U.S. market 
worth approximately $13 billion.  DINES, supra note 96, at 47.  Another source estimates that $10 
billion per year is generated from adult entertainment.  Rebecca Leung, Porn in the U.S.A.: Steve 
Kroft Reports on a $10 Billion Industry, CBS News (Sept. 5 2004), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/21/60minutes/main585049.shtml. 
 99. Jason Krause, The End of the Net Porn, 94 ABA J. 52, at 55 (Feb. 2008). 
 100. Id. at 55–56. 
 101. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  Pursuant to this decision, if pornographic material “taken as a 
whole, appeal[s] to the prurient interest in sex, which portray[s] sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do[es] not have serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value,” it is declared to be obscene.  Id. 
 102. See Jerry Seper, 27 Charged in Child-Porn Sting: Images Traded Worldwide on Internet 
Chat Room, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at A3 (discussing the Justice Department’s 
involvement in prosecuting persons caught “using a private Internet ‘chat room’ worldwide to 
trade thousands of images of child pornography”); see also Jesse P. Basbaum, Inequitable 
Sentencing for Possession of Child Pornography: A Failure to Distinguish Voyeurs from 
Pederasts, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1302 (2010) (discussing criticism of and statistics concerning 
sentencing guidelines for the crime of possessing child pornography); Clay Calvert & Justin 
Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 470 (2000) (noting that Internet pornography and its 
accompanying “sexually explicit speech raises serious questions about invasion of privacy and 
leaves in its wake real adult victims, not simply minors”); A.G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes 
on Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at A1 (discussing Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein’s view that those who view images of child pornography do not “present a threat to 
children,” in contrast to those who produce or sell photos). 
 103. Krause, supra note 99, at 56. 
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reliance on community standards of morality.104  Policing Internet use of 
pornography for approximately 28,258 users per second is simply an 
impossible situation.105 
Today, there is little or no need to pay for pornography at an SOB because it 
is free on the Internet;106 sites that allow watching or streaming pornography 
on the Internet are common place.107  The prevalence of wireless Internet 
access and the promise of downloadable high-definition movies that will 
permit pornography to be viewed on portable devices108 are creating a new 
type of lewdness or public nuisance: “second-hand smut.”109 At issue here is 
the appropriateness of viewing Internet pornography in public venues, such as 
buses, airplanes, gyms, libraries, and at sporting events when these displays 
may force a bystander to view pornographic images.110  With the growing use 
of portable laptop computers and hand-held electronics, more and more 
passive, non-accepting occupants of seats adjacent to Internet users are finding 
themselves unwilling captives of this “second-hand smut.”111  In order to limit 
this conduct in air travel, some airlines announced in 2008 that they are 
devising ways to filter inappropriate Internet usage.112 
                                                 
 104. LANE, supra note 95, at 284–88. 
 105. Family Safe Media, Pornography Statistics, http://www.familysafemedia.com/ 
pornography_statistics.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).  With Internet porn pages numbering 420 
million and porn web sites 4.2 million, it is not surprising that, on a daily basis, there are 68 
million search engine requests for pornography.  DINES, supra note 96, at 47; see also, The 
Average Guy and His Income, MEN’S HEALTH, http://www.menshealth.com/mens 
wealth/average_guy_income.html (William G. Phillips ed.) (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (noting that 
porn clips were among three items the “average guy” wishes automatic teller machines would 
dispense). 
  Another study determined that seventy percent of men in the eighteen to thirty-four age 
bracket view Internet porn at least once a month.  Erik Unger, Skin Trade Filling Corporate 
Cofers, REDEYE, May 14, 2004, at 8.  The average age for boys viewing porn is eleven years, 
with the corresponding argument that porn is thus “encoded into a boy’s sexual identity” and 
thereby prevents sexual development “out of life experiences” and, indeed becomes part of a 
child’s socialization.  DINES, supra note 96, at xi, 170. 
 106. Marcus Baram, Free Porn Threatens Adult Film Industry, ABC News (June 11, 2007), 
http://abcnews.go.com/business/story?id=3259416&page=1. 
 107. Monica Hesse, Publicly a Whole New Lewdness: Everywhere You Look, Porn Is 
Suddenly Inescapable, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009, at C1. 
 108. Mike Musgrove, Mini-Porn Could Be Mega-Business: Video iPods, Cell Phones 
Provide New Vehicles for Adult Industry, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at D1. 
 109. Hesse, supra note 107. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  But see Donna Goodison, Virgin Flights to Allow ‘Adult’ Sites, BOS. HERALD, Feb. 
11, 2009, at 30 (reporting that passengers on Virgin America air flights from Logan International 
Airport in Boston, Massachusetts to California can access “naughty” websites).  Interestingly, the 
annual revenues from the hotel industry’s in-room sale of pornographic movies has been placed at 
approximately $500 million.  DINES, supra note 96, at 52. 
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3.  Victimless Offenses or Causal Theories? 
Although the laws that regulate the business practices of SOBs may be 
considered both a “rational means of promoting ends,” and efficient, laws of 
this character are nevertheless “inefficacious” because the secondary effects 
and actual criminal conduct subsequent to allowing SOBs to operate under 
zoning codes “are either de jure or de facto victimless.” 113  Indeed, the very 
“fact of victimization is frequently unascertainable.”114 
One theory posits that pornography does not only eroticize male  
sexual-violence toward women by predisposing males to rape, but that it also 
actually intensifies “the predisposition in other males already so disposed.”115  
Put directly, pornography “undermines some males’ internal inhibitions against 
acting out their desire to rape”116 and promotes sexual arousal for some.117  
The conclusion, then, is that a causal link exists that establishes a clear 
connection between pornography and social harm118—“pornography causes 
rape,”119 discriminates against and commodifies women,120 and has an 
insidious effect on the psyche.121 
                                                 
 113. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 204, 213–14; see POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS, supra note 11, § 5.7 (discussing the regulation of sexual behavior and its economic 
impact).  The mid-twentieth century saw the creation of adult-use districts, or special-disorder 
zones referred to as “red-light districts,” where the sex industry was concentrated and derelict 
housing for the unemployed (termed “skid rows”) was placed.  NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, 
ORDERING THE CITY: LAND USE, POLICING, AND THE RESTORATION OF URBAN AMERICA  
102–04 (2010). 
  Boston’s adult-use district, formerly the city’s old red-light district, included  
adult-entertainment venues, pornographic book stores, and strip clubs, and became known as the 
“Combat Zone.”  Scott Van Voorhis, Wrecking Ball Ready for Combat: Towers Will Replace Red 
Lights, BOS. HERALD, Aug. 20, 2003, at 34.  Authorities decided to demolish and replace these 
businesses with apartment towers.  Id.; cf. Nate Schweber, Towns Use Zoning to Limit Sex 
Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at 6 (discussing zoning laws in some New Jersey 
municipalities that regulate SOBs by placing them, for example, only in the industrial areas). 
 114. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1, at 204. 
 115. DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIPS: PORNOGRAPHY, MISOGYNY, AND 
RAPE 119–20 (1998). 
 116. Id. 
 117. GEORGE P. SMITH II, FAMILY VALUES AND THE NEW SOCIETY: DILEMMAS OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 187 (1998). 
 118. RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 156. 
 119. Id. 
 120. PAMELA PAUL, PORNIFIED: HOW PORNOGRAPHY IS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES, OUR 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 242–43, 275 (2005). 
 121. Pamela Paul, The Cost of Growing up on Porn, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2010, at B5; see 
HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY, LAW, AND 
PORNOGRAPHY 64 (1996) (“The purpose [of pornography]—to arouse an elemental passion for 
other people’s bodies independently of any affection or regard for a particular person—virtually 
guarantees that human beings will be represented as instruments.”).  Whether “inflaming [one’s] 
sexual passions” can result in harm depends upon one’s perceptions.  Andrew Koppelman, Does 
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1641–42 (2005). 
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The opposing, and less emotional theory, acknowledges that objective proof 
of a direct link between attitude and behavior that causes harm needs more 
empirical research122 because there is insufficient evidence from psychological 
experiments that show any concrete connection between social attitudes and 
behavioral harm such as rape or criminal aggression.123  Correlations, at 
whatever level or degree, cannot be taken as proof of a definitive cause, 
however.124  Other sources of social violence have been found to be more of a 
catalyst for aggression than pornography.125  Such sources include “unstable or 
disturbed family life, physical and emotional abuse by parents . . . chronic 
unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, [and] mental illness.”126  Considered 
to be the most powerful of all sources of aggressive behavior, even more than 
sexual desire, is “the basic need to be regarded as a man.”127 
II.  NUISANCE AS AN EFFECTIVE LAND-USE TOOL 
Through its publication in 1979 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
specifically sections 827 and 828, the American Law Institute (ALI) sought to 
resolve previously expressed concerns regarding the instability of the law of 
nuisance.128  The ALI listed specific, objective factors to be considered when 
assessing whether the gravity of a plaintiff’s harm or injury is, when weighed 
against the utility of a defendant’s conduct, so unreasonable that he may seek 
redress for injunctive relief or damages under the law of nuisance.129 
Under the Restatement, the five factors for testing the claim of unreasonable 
conduct under nuisance, which in essence become a template for  
decision-making both at the initial stage of pleading and in subsequent judicial 
determinations, are: 
     (a) the extent of the harm involved; 
                                                 
 122. Public opinion surveys cannot be determinative of this issue; rather, social-scientific 
evidence is required.  L. W. SUMNER, THE HATEFUL AND THE OBSCENE: STUDIES IN THE LIMITS 
OF FREE EXPRESSION 124 (2004).   
  Recent statistical studies by Professor Todd Kendall of Clemson University show that 
expanded Internet access to pornography may well reduce the incidence of rape and validate other 
current studies concluding that its use does not cause crimes of this motive.  Steve Chapman, 
Does Pornography Cause Sexual Violence?, WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 2011, at 24. 
 123. GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE SOCIETY 108 
(1998).  Non-violent pornography, which accounts for the vast bulk available commercially to the 
public, has been shown by some studies to actually reduce aggression.  Nadine Strossen, A 
Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1182 
(1993); see Chapman, supra note 122, at 24. 
 124. F. M. Christensen, Elicitation of Violence: The Evidence, in PORNOGRAPHY: PRIVATE 
RIGHT OR PUBLIC MENACE? 221, 225 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1991). 
 125. Id. at 237–39. 
 126. Id. at 239. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979). 
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     (b) the character of the harm involved;  
     (c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or 
enjoyment invaded; 
     (d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the 
character of the locality; and 
     (e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.130 
Under the Restatement, a finding that interference with a public right is 
unreasonable and, thus, actionable requires a consideration of 
     (a) [w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference with 
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or 
     (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or 
administrative regulation, or 
     (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced 
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has 
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.131 
Traditionally, claims asserting public nuisance have allowed only public 
authorities to be the moving party132 and, further, have allowed injunctive, 
rather than legal, relief.133  Over the course of time in some jurisdictions, 
however, private parties have been permitted to maintain actions under public 
nuisance if they can show that they have suffered a “special injury,” in other 
words, if they can show an injury unique in some way from a general injury to 
the public.134  Notably, actions considered damaging to public morals, and 
therefore actionable under a claim of public nuisance (for example, indecent 
exposure and prostitution), have been allowed since the earliest recognition of 
the tort of nuisance.135  Consequently, the allowance, licensing, and placement 
                                                 
 130. Id. § 827.  Section 828 provides: 
     In determining the utility of conduct that cases an intentional invasion of another’s 
interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are important: 
the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; 
the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and 
the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion. 
Id. § 828. 
 131. Id. § 821B. 
 132. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 741, 745–46 (2003). 
 133. Id. at 814 (“Historically, the recovery of damages has been an ancillary and unusual 
remedy when a public nuisance was found to exist.”). 
 134. Id.; see also Matthew Saunig, Note, Rebranding Public Nuisance: City of Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. as a Failed Response to Economic Crisis, 59 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 911. 929–30 (2010) (analyzing the proper limits of public nuisance claims and cautioning 
against an unjustified expansion of this tort). 
 135. See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997,  
999–1000 (1966). 
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of an SOB within a zoning district raises the issue of when these actions by a 
municipal authority are reasonable, non-confiscatory (that is, they are not an 
unlawful taking), and not subject to an action for inverse condemnation by 
neighborhood property owners.136 
A.  Nuisances as Takings 
Can a nuisance ever ripen into a taking?  This is an intriguing question 
requiring an analysis that exceeds the scope of this Article.137  It is nonetheless 
important to note that some courts have chosen to collapse nuisance into the 
takings determination, effectively treating nuisance as a per se taking.138  
Others “equate nuisance . . . with regulatory takings.”139  Furthermore, the 
government may effect a taking when it “uses its own property in ways that 
interfere with the ability of other owners to use and enjoy their properties.140  
Accordingly, nuisance law and takings display a “lack of doctrinal 
coherence.”141  
As early as 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the extent to which a 
government could authorize or create a nuisance.142  In Baltimore & Potomac 
Railroad Co. v. First Baptist Church, the Court concluded that even though 
“Congress could authorize and immunize” actions that could be taken to be 
public nuisances—in this case the operation of a railroad and related 
facilities—Congress could not undertake such actions that would, in turn, 
                                                 
 136. See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 819, 820–23 (2006). 
 137. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue see generally Ball, supra note 136, and 
Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y 149 
(2000). 
 138. Ball, supra note 136, at 851–55. 
 139. Id. at 824. 
 140. Id. at 820. 
 141. Id. at 821–22. 
 142. See Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 330–32 (1883).  
More recently, in the 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that 
when legislative measures deprive property of all economically viable use and do not derive from 
property and nuisance principles, they constitute a taking. 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).  Justice 
Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, attempted to structure a test for determining the 
appropriateness of a “total taking inquiry.”  Id. at 1030–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Under this test, as with nuisance law issues, Justice Scalia sought to evaluate, 
among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent 
private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the social value of the 
claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease 
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant 
and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves 
the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 147, 151–54 (1995) (discussing the significance 
of the Lucas holding). 
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create a private nuisance.143  Because the burdens of such actions are imposed 
upon a small number of owners, no immunization is proper.144 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 
expanded on its previous holding in 1883 in First Baptist Church.145  The 
Court found that, when the land is used by the government or a private party 
acting with explicit governmental authority in a way that creates a nuisance, 
the use rises to a taking when the burden placed on the aggrieved party is 
“peculiar and substantial.”146  The components of this taking standard continue 
to confound.147 
B.  Inverse Condemnation 
Inverse condemnation is another remedial option available for recovering 
damages that result from indirect government actions that have the effect of 
causing a physical invasion to a plaintiff’s land, such as zoning 
accommodations and allowances for sexually oriented, adult businesses.148  
Unless a moving party proves the injury sustained from such an invasion is a 
foreseeable result of the zoning, however, any recovery under an action for 
inverse condemnation is likely to suffer a “noncognizable derivative taking.”149 
In 2007, a classic issue of inverse condemnation, combined with issues of 
land use and zoning, as well as nudity, race, and sexuality, arose when the 
Washington, D.C., City Council decided to relocate up to six adult clubs where 
pornographic movies were showed, nude dancing occurred, and private sex 
booths existed.150 The relocation of these SOBs, previously in Ward 6 of the 
city, was due to the development of the Washington Nationals baseball 
stadium, which had the effect of displacing primarily those venues that were 
homosexually oriented.151  Residents of Ward 5, who are predominantly low-
income, objected to the effort to move all of the displaced clubs to their 
neighborhoods, fearing that this business cluster would not only depress the 
already low real-estate values of private homes there, but also condemn Ward 
                                                 
 143. Ball, supra note 136, at 827–28 (citing Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co., 108 U.S. at 332). 
 144. Id. (citing Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co., 108 U.S. at 332). 
 145. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1924). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of 
the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231 (2004).  Thornburg v. 
Portland is regarded as the most important nuisance/takings decision of a state court.  Ball, supra 
note 136, at 851 (citing Thornburg v. Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 (Or. 1963) (suggesting 
nuisance effects a taking). 
 148. GARNETT, supra note 113, at 105. 
 149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. Yolanda Woodlee, NE Residents Fear Clubs Bill Would Create a ‘Red-Light Zone,’ 
WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at B1. 
 151. Id. 
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5 to little more than a “red light” district.152  The City Council settled the issue 
by directing that no more than two SOBs would be allowed in each of the eight 
city wards and that, in order to avoid clustering these operations, there must be 
1200 feet between the clubs.153 
Concentrating disorder in a particular zone has proven to amplify it, thereby 
causing spillovers to nearby neighborhoods adjacent to the zone of 
containment.154  Thus, many cities have opted, instead, for dispersing SOBs,155 
which has the practical effect of merely moving the problem elsewhere. 
C.  Moral Nuisances 
Under contemporary community standards, nuisance also has been defined 
as activity that is taken to be “unneighborly.”156 Immoral activity or conduct 
spawned from the placement and operation of SOBs could be seen, properly, 
as unneighborly.157 Consequently, some proffer a theory of moral nuisance as 
an additional remedy to fight immoral activity associated with the operation of 
SOBs.158 
Four presumptions are central to the functional applicability of moral 
nuisance: (1) “that the conduct of one’s neighbor can be judged immoral”; (2) 
“that such conduct causes real harms”; (3) “that those harms can be remedied 
by the law”; (4) “that what one does on one’s own land can be limited by the 
moral sensibilities of one’s neighbors”; and (5) that courts are qualified to 
render judgments on activities of this nature.159  The three decisive factors 
necessary to establishing an action for moral nuisance are “the value of a 
defendant’s activity, the location of the defendant’s activity, and . . . the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff.”160  When the activity the moving party complains of 
                                                 
 152. Id. 
 153. Yolanda Woodlee, District Passes Amended Bill on Relocating of Nude Clubs, WASH. 
POST, June 6, 2007, at B1; see also Elissa Silberman, Neighbors Protest at Reputed Sex Shop, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007, at B4 (discussing the outrage of luxury condominium owners in a 
Washington, D.C. neighborhood regarding a Fun Fair Video store that had been operating 
illegally as a sex shop for more than a decade). 
 154. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1107 (2005). 
 155. Id. at 1108; see Debbie Howlett, Sex Shops Infiltrate Small Towns, USA TODAY, Dec. 4, 
2003, at 3A (discussing the move of SOBs into smaller towns due to the dispersal methods used 
by larger cities). 
 156. See Robert Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as 
Land Use Control, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 748–49 (1973). 
 157. See Drew Lucas, Comment, There is a Porn Store in Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood: Will 
You Be Their Neighbor? How to Apply Residential Use Restrictive Covenants to Modern Home 
Businesses, 26 CAMPBELL L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2004) (discussing a web site that streams video 
of five women engaging in sexual activity who live in a Florida home unrestricted by zoning 
ordinances despite the complaints of neighbors). 
 158. Nagle, supra note 34, 266–69. 
 159. Id. at 268. 
 160. Id. at 312–13. 
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is both immoral and illegal, the claim of moral nuisance is strengthened 
considerably.161  A judgment regarding the morality of the challenged conduct 
must be grounded in the norms of the community in which a plaintiff 
resides.162  This, then, becomes a central weakness of the theory because 
determining those normative standards of morality is fraught with 
challenges.163 
D.  Combating a Central Weakness 
The central concern for applying the theory of moral nuisance can, perhaps, 
be resolved in large measure by relying on the secondary-effects doctrine.164  
More specifically, if a municipality can justify its regulation of SOBs based on 
comparative studies of other cities addressing this issue or other evidence 
which substantiates a reasonable belief165 that certain activities would degrade 
the moral character or fiber of the community by promoting prostitution and 
illegal drug use, such as the retail sale of pornographic literature and 
paraphernalia, that municipality could seek to block the placement of such an 
immoral business by utilizing this doctrine and the law of anticipatory 
nuisance.166  If such a business had already been opened, its offensive moral 
character could be recognized and an action in equity could be undertaken to 
close the business as a public moral nuisance.167 
                                                 
 161. Id. at 269. 
 162. Id.; see Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1642 (describing “moral relativism,” the 
idea that determining morality is “relative to the moral code of the particular culture in which the 
claim is advanced”). 
 163. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1640–41; supra Part I. 
 164. See infra Part IV.C. 
 165. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002); City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986); Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of 
Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722–23, 727 (7th Cir. 2003).  The Seventh Circuit in Ben’s Bar, Inc. 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s “road map of sorts” for testing the constitutionality of liquor 
regulations for adult-entertainment businesses that it discussed in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island.  Ben’s Bar, Inc., 316 F.3d at 713 (citing Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
505 (1996)).  In Ben’s Bar, Inc., however, the Seventh Circuit was careful to draw a distinction 
between zoning ordinances, or public indecency statutes, and adult-entertainment liquor 
regulations.  Id. at 714. 
 166. George P. Smith II, Re-validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 
687, 688, 696–97 (2005).  Under the tort of anticipatory nuisance, a plaintiff endeavors to prevent 
actions that will become nuisances in due course.  Id. at 697.  Although recognized at common 
law, and statutorily in Alabama and Georgia, this tort is seldom used because of an excessively 
high and complex burden of evidentiary proof, for example “reasonable certainty or high 
probability,” required to sustain its success.  Id. at 688, 703. 
 167. Daria Snadowsky, Note, The Best Little Whorehouse is Not in Texas: How Nevada’s 
Prostitution Laws Serve Public Policy, and How Those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEV. L.J. 217, 
223 (2005)  (quoting Kuban v. McGimsey, 605 P.2d 623, 627 (Nev. 1980)) (stating that properly 
exercised police powers may be used to prohibit previously lawful businesses that are deemed 
injurious to the public). 
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Also, an argument could be advanced which asserts that SOBs are, in their 
signage and other forms of visual advertisement and window displays often 
with provocatively posed mannequins, aesthetically unbalanced, unreasonable, 
and inconsistent with either the moral and historic character or business tone of 
the neighborhood in which they are located.168  In other words, that SOBs are 
aesthetic nuisances.169 
In modern practice, addressing moral grounds as a justification for 
regulating personal liberties, which include operating and allowing public 
access to SOBs, is not uniformly accepted as a valid reason to impose land-use 
control regulations.170  Indeed, some commentators argue that the resolution of 
complex moral issues and the restraint of social behavior by and through 
zoning is inappropriate.171 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003 
forbidding state regulation of sexual intimacies among consenting adults,172 it 
remains an open question whether morality by way of legislative actions taken 
to maintain a level of sexual morality is a legitimate state goal sufficient to 
abridge the personal freedoms of privacy and free association, or whether such 
attempts for restraint must be seen as preserving public health, safety, or 
welfare.173  Determinations of society’s objections and policy preferences for 
land development are essential to testing the effectiveness of land-use law.174  
What is certain, however, is that the state must act, consistent with the exercise 
of its police powers, to maintain order within society.175  It is inconceivable 
and illogical to argue that a personal right of sexual expression should be 
expanded to state-regulated public business, thus subjecting those businesses to 
strict constitutional review by the judiciary whenever this right is compromised 
or disallowed. 
                                                 
 168. See George P. Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic 
Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVT’L. L. REV. 53, 66–69, 80–83 (1991); Allison 
Klein, In Old Town, The Sex Shop is a Kiss-Off, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2009, at A1. 
 169. Smith & Fernandez, supra note 168, at 66–69, 80–83; see also Klein, supra note 168 
(discussing the anger of the residents and businesses over the opening of an SOB called “Le 
Tache” in a historic neighborhood in Alexandria, Virginia). 
 170. KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 146 (2007). 
 171. Thomas B. Griffen, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1374, 
1397–99 (1988); see also ERIC DAMIAN KELLY & CONNIE COOPER, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS 
WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT REGULATING SEX BUSINESSES 69–72 (2000) (discussing measures 
taken by local governments to regulate SOBs). 
 172. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 173. WING ET AL., supra note 170. 
 174. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 5, at 1. 
 175. WING ET AL., supra note 170 (noting that, when the states began to vary their exercise 
of the police power regarding issues of morality, controversy ensued). 
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E.  Public Health Nuisances 
In the early stages of national awareness of the public health hazards 
associated with the spread of HIV-AIDS, nuisance was, and still is for that 
matter, a potent weapon for closing places of assignation and debauchery as 
public nuisances, such as bathhouses.176  Many of these businesses have now 
“converted” themselves into private clubs;177 yet they continue to be subjected 
to closure as public health nuisances.178 
Because it is concerned with private sexual activity, Lawrence v. Texas179 is 
of little, if any, real value to the assertion of a constitutional guarantee to 
freedom of sexual association and intimacy on properties that must be licensed 
within a community under a proper zoning scheme.180  It strains the limits of 
credulity to assert that the Lawrence rule applies to sexual expression in 
publicly licensed venues.  Reinventing a bathhouse or other SOB into a private 
club, for example, still requires a business license, and it is argued that 
allowing fornication and other sexual perversions in establishments of this 
order is improper, immoral, and inconsistent with preserving the common good 
through the advancement of sound public-health policy.181 
Although land-use regulations and zoning ordinances are in many ways the 
preferred tools for regulating SOBs,182 more and more communities utilizing 
detailed operational land controls, which embody business-licensing 
ordinances, rather than only zoning plans, are finding better levels of success 
                                                 
 176. See City of N.Y. v. New Saint Mark’s Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982–84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1986) (granting an injunction against a bathhouse for public nuisance purposes, noting that the 
injunction is not violative of constitutional rights); see also GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES 103 
(George E. Haggerty ed. 2000) (describing bathhouse closures in California, Minnesota, and New 
York).  Interestingly, every major city in the United States has a gay bathhouse.  Gillian Telling, 
Bathhouses, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 6, 2005, at 90. 
 177. GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES, supra note 176 (“In New York, both commercial and 
private sex clubs have replaced the baths as places for men to gather and have sex . . . .”); 
Michele Garcia, From Peep Shows to the Look of Luxury: Ten Years After Crackdown, Skin 
Business Has New Image, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2005, at A3 (detailing how the “skin business” of 
New York City has transitioned into an upscale industry by transforming x-rated and peep show 
theaters into clubs or adult bars that continue to provide various venues for promiscuous sexual 
entertainment). 
 178. GAY HISTORIES AND CULTURES, supra note 176; see also Rachel Simon, Note, New 
York City’s Restrictive Zoning of Adult Oriented Businesses: A Constitutional Analysis, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 188, 202–03 (1995) (analyzing New York City’s Adult-Zoning 
Resolution and discussing the closing of adult businesses under the nuisance doctrine). 
 179. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see Christian J. Grostic, Note, Evolving 
Objective Standards: A Developmental Approach to Constitutional Review of Morals Legislation, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 (2006) (maintaining Lawrence adopted John Stuart Mill’s harm 
principle under which “morality inspired government action [is permitted] only when it is 
supported by reference to empirical or otherwise demonstrable harms”). 
 180. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (noting that “public conduct” was not at issue in the case, 
and prohibiting the state from declaring private sexual conduct a crime). 
 181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 182. Nagle, supra note 34, at 321. 
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in regulating SOBs.183  This is because licensing permits compliant businesses 
to operate and provides a procedure for simply closing business operations that 
violate the strict provisions of the license.184 Although considered especially 
effective as a tool for regulating on-premise entertainment by SOBs, licensing 
is more problematic when policing bookstores distributing obscene and 
pornographic literature and selling sex paraphernalia, all of which are protected 
free speech expressions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.185 
Because of the variety of uses promoted by SOBs, it is preferable to 
recognize each business as a “separate land-use category.”186  For example,  
[m]ixing lingerie, leather goods, and sexually oriented media or 
adding sex toys to the product mix of a retail outlet causes it to take 
on the image of selling sex, which makes it very different from a 
store that sells books or videos, some of which happen to be sexually 
oriented. . . . These stores [should] be referred to as “sex shops.”187   
Additionally, entertainment presented in closed booths or private rooms is 
clearly within the definition of an SOB.188 Classifying business conduct can, as 
seen, be quite complicated. 
In those cases where, for politically sensitive reasons or economically 
motivated ones resulting from restricted enforcement budgets, governmental 
“solutions” to regulating SOBs are too complicated, nuisance law is a potent 
weapon to consider.189  Guided by a common-sense application of sections 
821B, 827, and 828 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,190 the law of 
nuisance has a place in contemporary land-use control.191  The one real caveat 
for engrafting the theory of moral nuisance onto the general law of nuisance is 
the substantial difficulty in determining when personal and community 
standards of morality are so offended by the operations of SOBs that they 
become actionable in equity.192  As observed, perhaps the one hope for 
“activating” a claim for abatement of a moral nuisance would be through 
reliance on the doctrine of secondary effects to show evidentiary proof of the 
claim.193 
                                                 
 183. KELLY & COOPER, supra note 171, at 162. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.; see also infra Part III.B. 
 186. KELLY & COOPER, supra note 171, at 156. 
 187. Id. at 157–58. 
 188. Id. at 158. 
 189. See Ellickson, supra note 156, at 719, 762. 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 827–28 (1979). 
 191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Nagle, supra note 34, at 299–300 (explaining that, in order for a moral objection to 
become a basis for a nuisance claim, the “moral objection must be commonly held in the 
community,” but determining community standards may be problematic because “[d]ifferent 
communities have different norms of morality”). 
 193. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text. 
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III.  HISTORY OF REGULATING OBSCENITY 
A.  Early American Attempts 
Early regulation of obscenity194 in the United States followed the lead of 
regulation in England.195  Primarily, obscenity regulation was inspired by the 
religious community and guided by the prospect of offense to churches, as 
opposed to being focused on the actual sexual content of the material.196  
Protecting the religious communities remained the central focus of obscenity 
enforcement in the United States until the 1800s.197  Although the individual 
states began to enact anti-obscenity laws in the early 1820s,198 a strong federal 
presence was not felt in obscenity regulation until after the Civil War.199  
Under the leadership of Anthony Comstock, following passage of a federal law 
that prohibited the mailing of obscene material, an era of heightened 
enforcement began.200 
                                                 
 194. “Obscene refers to that which is repugnant or disgusting to the senses, or offensive, 
filthy, foul, repulsive, or loathsome. . . . Pornography, on the other hand, derived from the Greek 
word for harlot . . . is limited to depictions of sexual lewdness or erotic behavior.”  FREDERICK F. 
SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 1 n.1 (1976).  “[W]hile all pornography is obscene, the 
converse does not hold good.  In other words, obscene matter, which produces feelings of disgust, 
may be, but is not necessarily, pornographic as well.”  H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, A HISTORY OF 
PORNOGRAPHY 2 (1965).  This quote from 1965 is no longer the absolute it once was.  Under the 
community-based test for obscenity that is now employed, all pornography cannot be presumed 
obscene; indeed, in Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that “sex and obscenity are 
not synonymous.”  354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). 
 195. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 8. 
 196. See id. at 3. “[T]he Christian and common law tradition . . . [regulated sexual 
expression] only incidentally to the regulation of some other offense (especially blasphemy) and 
never as an end in itself.”  Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 
299, 305 (2008). 
 197. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10 (explaining the factors that prompted state legislatures 
to attempt to control sexually oriented materials in the 1800s); Boyce, supra note 196, at 312 
(“During the nineteenth century, in America even more than in Britain, obscenity began to be 
decoupled from the offenses with which it had historically been closely intertwined: sedition and 
blasphemy.”). 
 198. See SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10. 
 199. See id. (discussing the enactment and effect of federal legislation regarding obscene 
material); Boyce, supra note 196, at 313 (same).  Although the first federal law dealing with 
obscenity was passed in 1842 to stifle the distribution of imported French postcards, “few federal 
prosecutions resulted.”  Boyce, supra note 196, at 313; see also SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 10 
(“The years prior to the Civil War witnesses a proliferation of obscenity and lewdness statutes, 
but there were still few prosecutions.”). 
 200. SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 12–13.  Comstock championed the first federal obscenity 
law and was appointed to direct its enforcement at a national level.  Id. at 12.  Comstock touted 
his first-year enforcement accomplishments as including the seizure and destruction of “200,000 
pictures and photographs; 100,000 books; [and] 5,000 packs of playing cards.”  Id. at 13.  Over 
his career, Comstock is said to have destroyed nearly 160 tons of obscene material and to have 
bragged about prompting fifteen suicides.  Boyce, supra note 196, at 313–14. 
2011]   Regulating Morality 429 
Early obscenity laws presented the same central issue found in enacting and 
enforcing modern-day laws regulating obscenity: the lack of a definition of 
obscenity.201  In the absence of a statutory definition of obscenity, the courts 
borrowed the standard that was then utilized in England—the Hicklin test.202  
Under the Hicklin test, to determine whether something was obscene, the court 
had to decide whether the item “would have a tendency to deprave and corrupt 
the minds of those into whose hands the publication might fall.”203  This test 
did not apply a reasonable person standard; instead, it coddled the citizenry by 
presuming that the possible audience included impressionable children, thus 
reducing the obscenity standard to a protectionist footing.204  Through the 
application of the Hicklin test, courts made ad hoc determinations of obscenity 
in particular publications; however, “in none of these cases did any court deal 
with the fundamental relationship between obscenity and the First 
Amendment.”205   
B.  Transitioning to Community-Based Standards for Defining Obscenity 
The Supreme Court finally began to analyze obscenity regulation from a 
constitutional standpoint in 1957.206  In Roth v. United States, the Court 
                                                 
 201. Boyce, supra note 196, at 314.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines obscenity as “[t]he 
characteristic or state of being morally abhorrent or socially taboo, esp[ecially] as a result or 
referring to or depicting sexual or excretory functions.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004).  The Oxford English Dictionary defines obscene as “abominable, disgusting, filthy, [and] 
indecent.”  THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989). 
 202. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733 (E.D. Mo. 1889) (citing R. v. Hicklin, 
(1868) 3 Law Reports 360 (Q.B.) 371) (adopting the obscenity standard announced in England). 
 203. Id. 
     One of the significant aspects of the Hicklin test . . . is that the obscenity vel non of a 
book, pamphlet, magazine, or picture was to be evaluated not in terms of its effect on 
the hypothetical “average man,” but by its effect on anyone who might in fact 
conceivably read it. 
SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 15–16. 
 204. See SCHAUER, supra note 194, at 15–16. 
 205. Id. at 29.  The Hicklin test persisted in the American judicial system—albeit weakening 
over time—from the early 1800s until the early half of the twentieth century, leading up to the 
1950s when the Supreme Court analyzed obscenity from a First Amendment standpoint and 
created a standard for obscenity based more on the reasonable man than on vulnerable children.  
See Boyce, supra note 196, at 314–16; see, e.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 
1945) (concluding that a publication’s effect on an ordinary person should determine if it is 
obscene); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) (arguing that material is not 
obscene merely because a child might gain access to a publication); United States v. One Book 
Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (concluding that the definition of obscene 
must be judged based on the average person). 
 206. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (“[T]his is the first time the 
question has been squarely presented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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directly addressed the First Amendment issues raised by attempts to stifle 
obscene speech and publications.207  The Court recognized that 
     [a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection 
of the guaranties [of freedom of speech], unless excludable because 
they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.  But 
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of 
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.208 
Therefore, the Court provided a more workable and realistic way to 
distinguish between unprotected, obscene speech and protected, non-obscene 
speech.209 
In fashioning the new test—which discarded the Hicklin test—the Court 
stated that the First Amendment protected speech that furthered political or 
social growth, not all speech.210  More specifically, the First Amendment did 
not protect speech that appealed only to a person’s prurient interests.211  The 
Court did not, however, note in its repudiation of the Hicklin test that the test 
was overbroad and may have included material that dealt with sex in a 
legitimate fashion.212 
In rejecting the Hicklin test, the Roth Court cobbled together elements from 
various tests used by lower courts.213  The Court set forth the following new 
test: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest.”214  Following the announcement of this test in 1957, 
obscenity law transitioned from assuming that everything pornographic was 
                                                 
 207. Id. at 479 & n.1 (“[T]he primary constitutional question is whether the federal obscenity 
statute violates the provision of the First Amendment that ‘Congress shall make no  
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .’” (omissions in original)). 
 208. Id. at 484. 
 209. See id. at 489. 
 210. Id. at 483–84. 
 211. Id. (“The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”).  The Court noted that “[o]bscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner 
appealing to prurient interest.”  Id. at 487.  The Court defined this type of material as “material 
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”  Id. 
 212. Id. at 489 (“The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon 
the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and 
so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and press.”). 
 213. Id. at 489 & n.26. 
 214. Id. at 489; see Stephen Gillers, A Tendency to Deprave and Corrupt: The 
Transformation of American Obscenity Law from Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
215, 296 (2007) (discussing how the Court’s decision in Ulysses set the stage for the test the 
Supreme Court would later develop to replace Hicklin). 
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obscene to a community-based legal area in which not even “all hard-core 
pornography . . . qualified as obscene.”215 
Following fifteen years of the Supreme Court reversing community-based 
determinations of obscenity,216 a new test was announced in 1973.217  The 
Court, in Miller v. California, set forth a three-part test: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.218 
The Court responded to the inevitable criticism of the fluid application of a 
reasonable person, community-based test by stating: “[t]he mere fact juries 
may reach different conclusions as to the same material does not mean that 
constitutional rights are abridged.”219  Further, the Court clarified that only the 
first and second prongs of the Miller test are truly community-based standards, 
leaving the value-judgment prong as a reasonable person test, not in a certain 
community, but generally.220  Drawing on the opinion in Roth, which stated the 
importance of protecting unpopular ideas,221 the Court wrote that “the ideas a 
work represents need not obtain majority approval to merit protection.”222  
Therefore, the government does not abridge a First Amendment right if the 
material is judged by a reasonable person to appeal to a person’s prurient 
                                                 
 215. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 296 
(2009); see also supra note 200. 
 216. Boyce, supra note 196, at 317–18 (“[T]he court ‘systematically Redrupped—reviewed 
and reversed summarily, without further opinion—scores of obscenity rulings entered by lower 
state and federal courts.’” (quoting EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE 
LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 515 (1992))); see also Redrup v. New York, 
386 U.S. 767, 770–71 (1967) (per curiam). 
 217. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 218. Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 219. Id. at 26 n.9. 
 220. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).  Interestingly, American laws attempt, 
often with little success, to differentiate between obscene nudity and artistic nudity that has 
redeeming social value.  Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 245, 249 (2010); see also PHILIP CARR-GOMM, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NAKEDNESS 
148–49, 255, 257 (2010) (discussing the American perception of nakedness); Flashing Flesh: The 
Politics of Nudity, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 79 (reviewing PHILIP CARR-GOMM, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF NAKEDNESS (2010), and discussing the dynamics of politics and the cultural norms 
that shape society’s response to nakedness); Blake Gopnik, In Art We Lust: At Second Blush, 
Classic Works Are Allowed to Rise to Their Full Erotic Potential, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2009, at 
E1 (observing that “[a]ny culture that thinks ‘sex’ when it sees naked bodies, will still think sex 
when it sees pictures of them,” regardless of their artistic provenance). 
 221. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 222. Pope, 481 U.S. at 500. 
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interest and if the work, taken as a whole and weighed against a national 
standard, offers no value to society.223 
Although a finding that an establishment is obscene allows a community to 
completely ban it from operating, finding that a business deals only in non-
obscene materials does not end the inquiry.224  The Supreme Court has allowed 
for heightened zoning requirements for even non-obscene SOBs.225 
IV.  ZONING LAW AND SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES 
A.  Overview of Zoning Schemes 
Zoning is a use of local governments’ delegated police powers to  
“exercise . . . the right to control the use of real property.”226  “The essence of 
zoning is to provide a balanced and well ordered scheme for all activity 
deemed essential to the particular municipality.”227  Zoning schemes can be 
established as exclusionary or cumulative depending on the desires of the local 
government implementing the scheme.228  An exclusionary scheme restricts the 
use of the zoned area to only the use for which it is particularly zoned, while a 
cumulative scheme allows the use for which it is zoned in addition to any 
higher use, such as residential use.229  Within a master zoning plan, there may 
be isolated instances where land is zoned for a purpose outside the character of 
                                                 
 223. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (providing that, among the considerations to determine if 
material is obscene, is “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value”); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 16.56, at 1383 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing the third element of the Miller test and emphasizing 
that the value of the work depends on the perspective of a reasonable person). 
 224. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 225. See Young v. Mini Am. Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (discussing zoning laws 
relevant to all motion-picture theatres, not just those showing adult films). 
 226. Platte Cnty. v. Chipman, 512 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (“Such [zoning] 
power is not enjoyed by lesser governing bodies, such as, counties and municipalities, in the 
absence of specific grant or delegation to such bodies by the sovereign.”). 
     Police power is a concept of obscure and ancient origins.  The police power, which 
protects the state and ensures citizens’ rights against one another is founded on one of 
the most ancient principles of English common law.  This principle is commonly 
expressed in the old legal maxim: “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” which is 
loosely translated as, “enjoy your property in such manner as to not injure that of 
another.” 
6 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 35.02[1], at 35-3 (Eric Damian Kelly 
ed., 2010); see also Smith, Nuisance Law, supra note 7, at 680 (“No doubt the most  
well-established or inherent principle of the law of nuisance as well as its most contentious is to 
be found in the principle of Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.”). 
 227. J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 290 A.2d 452, 456 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1972).  “The purpose of zoning is to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects that one type of land 
use might have on another.”  King v. Caddo Parish Comm’n, 719 So.2d 410, 415 (La. 1998). 
 228. 7 ROHAN, supra note 226, § 39.03, at 39-37 to 39-38. 
 229. Id. 
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the surrounding land.230  These isolated parcels are said to have been spot 
zoned, a practice that is usually considered suspect based on the overriding 
need for uniformity and the belief that the original zoning classification was 
purposeful and well thought out.231 
Zoning ordinances enacted to control the location of SOBs would, in most 
instances, be considered reverse spot zoning.232  A general constitutional 
challenge to spot zoning may lie in procedural due process, which requires 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.233  In the zoning or re-zoning 
of SOBs, however, more is at play.  In addition to the typical zoning challenge 
based on procedural due process, the owner of an SOB would have a cause of 
action based in the abridgement of his First Amendment right to free speech 
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.234  Specifically, in 
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court, in order to balance the 
rights of the owner of an SOB with the interests of the community, had to 
formulate a test which took into account the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of the owner and the presumptive enforceability of zoning laws 
formulated under the police powers.235 
                                                 
 230. Id. § 38A.01, at 38A-3. 
 231. Id. § 38A.01, at 38A-10. 
 232. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 5, § 5.10, at 192–93.  Reverse spot 
zoning implies that, instead of special affirmative treatment for a particular parcel of land, the 
parcel in question is more restrictively zoned than its neighboring parcels.  6 ROHAN, supra note 
226, § 38A.01, at 38A-9.  “Such action generally has been held to be invalid as unjustifiably 
discriminatory unless the interests of the community as a whole are served thereby.”  Id. 
 233. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985). 
The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the 
litigation, whether in person or through counsel.  The notice must be the best 
practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.” 
Id. at 812 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
 234. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 235. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“[I]t must be said 
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary 
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”); see also JULES B. GERARD, LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSES §§ 2.02, 2.08 
(2004 ed.) (discussing the Supreme Court position on the First Amendment and providing an 
explanation of due process).  Nuisance actions provide another option for controlling the influx or 
growth of SOBs outside the zoning context.  See Nagle, supra note 34, at 267–68.  Private 
landowners affected by the secondary effects, which governments seek to limit, may have an 
action against the neighboring business owner for a moral nuisance.  See id.  A moral nuisance 
action “presumes that what one does on one’s own land can be limited by the moral sensibilities 
of one’s neighbor.”  Id. at 268. 
434 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 60:403 
B.  The Interplay of Obscenity Regulation and Zoning Law 
Zoning, as an application of a government’s police powers, must be related 
to the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the governed public.236  When, 
however, a community is zoning SOBs, a two-step inquiry is required.237  First, 
there must be a determination under the Miller test238 of whether the material 
distributed by the SOB is obscene.239  If the material is classified as obscene, 
then it is offered no protection under the First Amendment and the business 
can be prohibited altogether.240  If, however, the material is deemed to be  
non-obscene, but still sexually oriented, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
community’s right to restrict the location of the distributing business.241  The 
determination to restrict the location of SOBs must be based, however, on 
something other than the desire to suppress non-obscene speech, otherwise 
known as the secondary-effects doctrine.242 
C.  Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. and the Secondary-Effects Doctrine 
1.  The Introduction of the Secondary-Effects Doctrine 
In 1972, Detroit enacted zoning ordinances that differentiated “between 
motion picture theaters which exhibit sexually explicit ‘adult’ movies and 
those which do not.”243  Those theaters that do exhibit adult movies were 
restricted from being “located within 1,000 feet of any two other ‘regulated 
uses’ or within 500 feet of a residential area.”244  These ordinances, which 
                                                 
 236. Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
 237. See Simon, supra note 178, at 192–95. 
 238. See supra text accompanying note 218. 
 239. See Simon, supra note 178, at 192–93. 
 240. Id. at 193–94. 
 241. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–73 (1976) (holding that placing 
location restrictions on SOBs does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).  It has been 
suggested that the courts have, over time, used three tests to determine whether ordinances 
restricting SOBs are constitutional: a “population proportion test”; a “total acreage test”; and a 
“supply and demand test.”  Ashley C. Phillips, Comment, A Matter of Arithmetic: Using Supply 
and Demand to Determine the Constitutionality of Adult Entertainment Zoning Ordinances, 51 
EMORY L. REV. 319, 321–22 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Another approach 
essentially collapses the second and the third tests listed above into one.  See Matthew L. 
McGinnis, Note, Sex, but Not in the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the First Amendment, and 
Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2005) (discussing the Renton 
test and considering the Supreme Court’s treatment of “adult-entertainment zoning”). 
 242. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (noting that 
content-based restrictions on speech are per se unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
 243. Young, 427 U.S. at 52.  To be classified as an adult theater, the theater must display 
films which show “[h]uman genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; . . . acts of human 
masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy; . . . fondling or other erotic touching,” or a display of 
certain delineated anatomic parts.  Id. at 53 & n.4 (citation omitted in original). 
 244. Id. at 52. 
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amended a ten-year-old “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance,” were enacted to combat 
the burgeoning influx of crime and unwanted “transients” that can occur in 
areas where SOBs are located in close proximity to each other.245  Further, 
Detroit argued that this co-location caused increased crime, particularly 
prostitution, and increased urban flight by both residents and businesses.246   
Two operators of adult theaters brought an action challenging the new zoning 
ordinances on Equal Protection and First Amendment grounds.247 
In this case of first impression analyzing the interaction between zoning and 
free speech, the Court began its analysis by noting that all theaters, not merely 
adult theaters, must satisfy some locational and licensing requirements to 
receive zoning approval in Detroit.248  Further, the Court stated that separation 
requirements did not offend First Amendment principles,249 classifying this 
requirement as a proper time, place, or manner regulation in furtherance of 
“significant governmental interests.”250  The Court emphasized that in other 
instances, like commercial speech or distribution of non-obscene pornography 
to minors, which do not require a secondary-effects analysis to be restricted, 
                                                                                                                 
     In addition to adult motion picture theaters and “mini” theaters . . . the regulated 
uses include adult bookstores; cabarets (group “D”); establishments for the sale of beer 
or intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises; hotels or motels; pawnshops; 
pool or billiard halls; public lodging houses; secondhand stores; shoeshine parlors; and 
taxi dance halls. 
Id. at 52 n.3. 
 245. Id. at 54–55. 
 246. Id. at 55. 
 247. Id. at 50; see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.  The adult-theater operators also 
challenged on due process vagueness grounds, but that argument was summarily rejected by the 
Court because even if the ordinance was vague as asserted, neither plaintiff had standing to 
challenge the possibly vague language.  Young, 427 U.S. at 58–59. 
 248. Young, 427 U.S. at 62 (noting that zoning and licensing restrictions do not trigger 
automatic invalidation of ordinances on First Amendment grounds). 
 249. Although 500 and 1000 foot separations were the methods chosen by the local 
government in Young, id. at 52, other avenues of regulation exist.  The local government in 
Renton chose to cluster SOBs in one section of the city, leaving a majority of the city off-limits to 
these business owners.  City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 44–45 (1986).  
The distance and locational requirements weigh less in determining whether to approve a 
regulation than does the underlying purpose of the exclusionary zones.  See New Albany DVD, 
L.L.C. v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 1000-foot 
buffer is not a dispositive issue as the requirement that a regulation be tailored to serve a 
significant purpose does not require the most narrowly tailored restriction possible). 
 250. Young, 427 U.S. at 63 & n.18.  A time, place, or manner restriction is a content-neutral 
regulation that restricts the location of a speech-related activity.  NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 223, at §16.47, at 1320.  To determine the legitimacy of an alleged time, place, or manner 
regulation, courts use a three-part test analyzing whether the restriction is “content-neutral, 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative 
channels of communication.”  Id. 
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the government can create a content-based regulation without running afoul of 
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.251 
The Court gave great deference to the city’s assertion that the preservation 
of “the character of its neighborhoods” was enough justification for this 
ordinance and that its factual findings were adequate to demonstrate that the 
desired effect would be achieved through this regulation.252  Further, the Court 
stated that, because the only thing “at stake [was] nothing more than a 
limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited . . . the city’s 
interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately 
support[ed]” its separation requirements for sexually oriented businesses.253  
Thus, the secondary-effects doctrine—a new doctrine with which to judge 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech—was formulated.254 
The secondary-effects doctrine legitimizes the regulation of non-obscene 
sexually oriented material by focusing, not on the suppression of speech, but 
on the effects that an SOB may have on the surrounding area.255  The 
particularized effects experienced in each locality are less important to courts 
than the local government’s assertion that possible effects exist other than the 
mere promotion of sexually oriented material.256  Some secondary effects 
accepted by courts include the reduction of crime, the prevention of decreased 
property values, and the preservation of the “quality of the city’s 
neighborhoods.”257  However, the secondary effect most cited as justification 
                                                 
 251. Young, 427 U.S. at 68–70 (“Such a line may be drawn on the basis of content without 
violating the government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected 
communication.”).  The Court was explicit that total suppression would violate the First 
Amendment, but “the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for 
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.”  Id. at 70–71. 
 252. Id. at 71 (“[T]he city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with 
solutions to admittedly serious problems.”). 
 253. Id. at 71–72.  “Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has 
imposed no limitation on those who wish to view them.”  Id. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 254. See id. at 71 n.34. 
 255. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 583 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 256. See infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 257. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (citing City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1986)).  A number of influential studies are 
referenced when analyzing the secondary impacts of SOBs.  See, e.g., Indianapolis Dep’t of 
Metro. Dev., Div. of Planning, Adult Entertainment Businesses in Indianapolis: An Analysis i–iv 
(1984), available at http://secondaryeffectsresearch.com/files/Indianapolis,%2084.pdf (discussing 
a study of the effects of adult entertainment businesses in Indianapolis).  The Indianapolis study 
found a direct correlation between crime and the character of a residential neighborhood and 
discovered that areas with operating adult-entertainment businesses saw a fifty-six percent 
increase in crime.  Id. at ii.  More specifically, sex-related crimes occurred four times more 
frequently in those neighborhoods.  Id.  Furthermore, although the state’s overall housing-market 
was decreasing with regard to the number of houses being placed on the market, the opposite was 
true in neighborhoods with adult-entertainment businesses where houses were being placed on the 
market at prices substantially lower than expected.  Id. at ii–iii.  Eighty percent of real-estate 
appraisers reported that even one adult business would depreciate the value of surrounding 
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for certain regulations is the projected introduction or expansion of crime in a 
certain locality.258  Therefore, the government’s assertion in Young that it was 
attempting to curb the secondary effects of increased crime, decreased property 
values, and increased population flight, was sufficient justification to the 
incidental imposition on sexually oriented business owners’ First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.259 
2.  Is the Secondary-Effects Doctrine Truly Content-Neutral? 
Although most government-imposed restrictions on speech require an 
analysis under the strict scrutiny test,260 a content-neutral regulation is 
governed by a lesser standard.261  Content neutrality requires regulation 
“without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”262  Further, 
regulations must be reviewed to see if government “disagreement with the 
message” was the underlying reason for enactment.263  Some interference with 
speech is allowed under content-neutral regulations if that interference is 
“incidental” and the purpose is “unrelated to the content of [the] 
expression.”264 
Critical analysis demonstrates that zoning ordinances targeting SOBs cannot 
qualify as content-neutral.265  Although these ordinances are upheld under a 
time, place, and manner test if they only limit the locations of businesses and 
do not limit the amount of speech allowed,266 it must be recognized that they 
                                                                                                                 
property, and fifty percent of these appraisers opined that the depreciation is often over ten 
percent.  Id.  For an in-depth analysis of these major studies, see Peter R. Hecht, Report To: The 
American Center for Law and Justice on the Secondary Impacts of Sex Oriented Businesses 
(1996), http://secondaryeffectsresearch.com/files/ACLJ,%2096.pdf. 
 258. See, e.g., Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 436 (discussing a 1977 study that 
documented increased crime rates in areas populated with sexually oriented businesses); Barnes, 
501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowledging significant government interest in 
“preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes”); Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (noting 
significant government interest in preventing crime). 
 259. Young, 427 U.S. at 71–73. 
 260. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1131–32.  Strict scrutiny requires the 
government to prove that a restriction on speech “is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.”  
Id. § 16.1, at 1131. 
 261. Id. § 16.1, at 1131–33. 
 262. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 263. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
295 (1984)).  “The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”  Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70–71 (1976).  The Court in Young 
clearly endorsed the use of content as a dividing line for zoning regulations provided the 
regulation did not completely stifle the protected form of expression.  Id.  Therefore, these are 
content-based regulations.  See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1131–32 
(discussing and providing examples of content-based regulations). 
 266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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are a judicially created exception to content-based strict scrutiny267 and not 
truly content-neutral.  The ordinances in Young specifically and overtly 
regulated one type of speech and expression, that which is sexually oriented, 
and therefore this cannot be called content-neutral.268  The Court should 
acknowledge this anomaly and state that this is one more exception to the strict 
scrutiny test, which was designed to benefit communities and allow them to 
exercise their police powers.269  No such acknowledgment has been made, 
however, and courts have varied views when addressing sexually oriented 
zoning regulations, calling some content-neutral, some content-based, and 
some viewpoint-neutral, though they apply the secondary-effects doctrine to 
the zoning issues generally.270 
3.  From Young to Alameda 
Although Justice Lewis F. Powell’s Young concurrence suggested adopting 
the four-part test of United States v. O’Brien,271 the majority chose to articulate 
a slightly different, but related, test as it continued to wrestle with the zoning 
of SOBs.272  In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court announced 
a three-part test to analyze zoning ordinances with respect to sexually oriented 
businesses.273  Under this test, three questions must be addressed: (1) whether 
                                                 
 267. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 800 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Except in instances involving well-settled categories of 
proscribable speech, strict scrutiny is the baseline rule for reviewing any content-based 
discrimination against speech.” (internal citation omitted)).  A strict scrutiny analysis requires the 
Government to prove that the regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.”  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 
(2007). 
 268. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
 269. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992). 
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, 
has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are 
“of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” 
Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 270. See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (discussing a content-based statute under a content-
neutral analysis); PMG Int’l. Div., L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that a law restricting the sale of sexually explicit magazines in military exchanges was 
“reasonable and viewpoint neutral”). 
 271. Young, 427 U.S. at 79–80.  The Court observed that 
[u]nder [the O’Brien] test, a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its 
incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, “if it is within the constitutional 
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on . . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 
Id. (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
 272. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text. 
 273. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986). 
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the ordinance is a time, place, and manner regulation; (2) whether the 
regulation is content-neutral or content-based;274 and (3) if it is content-neutral, 
whether the “time, place, and manner regulations . . . serve a substantial 
governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of 
communication.”275 
In applying this test to the facts in Renton, the Court paralleled many of its 
findings in Young.276  The Renton Court, in its discussion of the first prong, 
held that because the ordinance “[did] not ban adult theaters altogether,” it was 
“properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”277  In 
turning to the second prong, which concerns the distinction between  
content-based and content-neutral ordinances, the Court looked first to the 
underlying motivation for the regulation.278  The Court accepted the district 
court’s finding that “the City Council’s ‘predominate concerns’ were with the 
secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content of adult films 
themselves.”279  Consequently, after accepting the district court finding 
regarding the city council’s intent, the Court found the regulation to be 
content-neutral and not violative of First Amendment principles.280  Quoting 
the deferential standard set forth in Young,281 the Renton Court went one step 
further in its analysis of the third prong.282  The Court rejected the finding of 
the Ninth Circuit—that each city must perform individualized research prior to 
enacting secondary-effect zoning ordinances—and held that reliance on the 
studies and experiences of a similarly situated city was sufficient to support the 
city’s assertion that its underlying goal in enacting the ordinance was to 
prevent deleterious secondary effects.283  In looking at the limit to alternative 
                                                 
 274. The Court must find an ordinance to be content-neutral in order to continue with the test 
because the “Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on 
the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 275. Id. at 47.  The final portion references an intermediate level of scrutiny, as opposed to 
the strict scrutiny normally required for First Amendment issues.  See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 223, § 16.1, at 1133. 
 276. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 46. 
 277. Id. (“The Renton ordinance, like the one in [Young v.] American Mini  
Theatres . . . merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any 
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.”). 
 278. Id. at 47. 
 279. Id. (internal citation omitted).  Specifically, the Court found that “[t]he ordinance by its 
terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and 
generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neighborhoods, commercial districts, 
and the quality of urban life.’”  Id. at 48 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 280. Id. at 48. 
 281. Id. at 50 (“[A] city’s ‘interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one 
that must be accorded high respect.’” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 
(1976))). 
 282. Id. at 50–52. 
 283. Id. at 50–51. 
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means of communication, the Court noted that both lower courts found that the 
520-acre set-aside for adult theaters was “[a]mple, accessible real  
estate, . . . criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and roads.”284  At bottom, the 
Court determined that Renton’s ordinance regulating sexually oriented 
businesses was valid and not violative of any constitutional rights.285 
Although the case did not involve the zoning of a sexually oriented business, 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.286 had the last significant effect on the Renton test 
prior to the Court’s consideration of City of Los Angeles v. Alameda.287  In 
Pap’s A.M., the city had enacted a generalized ordinance that banned nudity in 
all public locations.288  The Court stated that “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ 
[was] not an inherently expressive condition.”289  Following that logic, the 
regulation was determined to be content-neutral and not subject to a strict 
scrutiny test for suppression of speech.290  The Pap’s A.M. Court cited to 
Renton, but applied the O’Brien test, the four-prong precursor to Renton’s 
three-prong test, and found the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s 
powers.291   
More significant than the final conclusion, however, was the support local 
governments received for their decisions to fight secondary effects.  The Pap’s 
A.M. Court found that cities could rely on, not only studies conducted by 
similarly situated cities, such as the city in Renton, but also on judicial 
                                                                                                                 
We think the Court of Appeals imposed on the city an unnecessarily rigid burden of 
proof.  The record in this case reveals that Renton relied heavily on the experience of, 
and studies produced by, the city of Seattle.  In Seattle, as in Renton, the adult theater 
zoning ordinance was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence 
of even one such theater in a given neighborhood. 
Id.  When discussing secondary effects as a motivator, the Supreme Court “has considered both 
quantitative and intangible secondary effects in establishing an important government interest.”  
Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 470 (2004).  Intangible effects include “deterioration or urban life 
and city neighborhoods, decrease in quality and character of community life, and degradation of 
order and public morality.”  Id. at 469–70.  Quantifiable effects include crime increases, traffic 
changes, and noise increases.  Id. at 470. 
 284. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brief 
for Appellants app. at 28a, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (No. 84-
1360)). 
 285. Id. at 54–55 (“In sum, we find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid 
governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters.” (quoting 
Young, 427 U.S. at 71)). 
 286. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 287. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 288. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 283. 
 289. Id. at 289. 
 290. Id. at 290–92. 
 291. Id. at 295–97, 301–02. 
2011]   Regulating Morality 441 
conclusions from other secondary-effects cases.292  Combining the broad 
deference given to local governments in the exercise of their police powers 
through zoning with the ability to rely on previous judicial conclusions 
regarding possible secondary effects appears to give any carefully crafted 
legislation wide latitude to locate SOBs within a particular jurisdiction. 
4.  The Secondary-Effects Doctrine in Action: Evidentiary Issues in Lower        
     Courts 
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has, in its evolution of the 
secondary-effects doctrine, reduced the required showing of a local 
government to uphold an ordinance, lower courts are not following  
lock-step.293  When there is doubt regarding the government’s intentions for 
enacting an ordinance, it is required to rebut that doubt with an evidentiary 
showing of the secondary effects it intended to inhibit by imposing the 
ordinance.294  This evidentiary burden is minimal; the government need only 
produce evidence that “fairly supports” the asserted secondary effect rationale 
for the regulation.295  However, even in light of this low evidentiary burden, 
the government cannot assert a post facto secondary-effect rationale for a 
regulation that was initially intended to restrict the distribution of sexually 
oriented material.296  Although the Supreme Court has allowed municipalities 
to rely on studies regarding the secondary effects on neighboring jurisdictions, 
lower courts appear to give less deference to these ordinances and require a 
local government to meet the already low standard of “fairly supports.”297 
                                                 
 292. Id. at 296–97 (“Because the nude dancing of Kandyland is of the same character as the 
adult entertainment at issue in Renton[ and] Young, . . . it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that 
such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects.”). 
 293. See, e.g., New Albany DVD, L.L.C. v. City of New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 559–60 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that reliance on other cities’ studies was not sufficient because those cities 
relied on data for live shows, though the business in question was selling only take-home 
materials). 
 294. Id. at 560. 
 295. Id. (citing City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002)). 
 296. See White River Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 
2007) (noting that the “Renton standard suggests that pre-enactment evidence [of secondary 
effects] is necessary” and that a city must have evidence such that it reasonably believed before 
enacting the regulation that it would be relevant to the issue sought to be addressed); McCrothers 
Corp. v. City of Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124, 134 (N.D. 2007) (concluding a city ordinance was 
valid because the court was “satisfied that the predominating factor in enacting the zoning 
ordinances was the negative secondary effects of the adult establishments . . . , rather than an 
intention to restrict the First Amendment rights of [the ordinance’s challengers]”). 
 297. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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V.  APPLYING THE SECONDARY-EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
OTHER LAND-USE CONTROLS 
So long as the genetic code continues to author and, thereby, create an 
ineradicable human sexual drive,298 and modern society creates an atmosphere 
of intrigue, fantasy, and titillation with human sexuality,299 obscenity and 
pornography will have a ready market for entrepreneurialism.300  Indeed, the 
businesses that pander to and prey upon sexual interests and salacious 
curiosities will continue to reach every segment of society and every point of 
geography,301 both physical and electronic.302 
The extent to which a free society seeks to regulate sexual expression is 
problematic.303  What was defined as immoral or “contra bonos mores”304 in 
the twentieth century has become less of an issue in today’s liberal society.305  
Freedom of sexual intimacy and expression are rights protected by the First 
                                                 
 298. See SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 47–48 (James Strachey, 
trans., 2d ed. 1961) (“From the very first we recognized the presence of a sadistic component in 
the sexual instinct.”); POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 1 (“From the genes, and perhaps 
from early childhood development as well, we obtain out basic sexual drive and preferences.”). 
 299. LANE, supra note 95, at 289; see also Gopnik, supra note 220, at E1 (discussing nudity 
and sexual themes in art). 
 300. See LANE, supra note 95, at xvi–xxi (discussing, in part, the presence and prevalence of 
pornography); see also DINES, supra note 96, at 47, 52 (marveling at the “staggering” size of the 
pornography industry).  The “pornographization” of American culture has been advanced 
significantly by television, such as the series Sex and the City where “porn-type sex is a fixture on 
the show,” and in the print media by publications such as Cosmopolitan Magazine, which has, 
over the years, featured pedestrian suggestions for non-traditional levels of sexual gratification.  
DINES, supra note 96, at xxx, 105–07. 
 301. Zoning laws in rural communities are not capable of coping with the flux of sexually 
oriented businesses because “most small towns and counties do little more than segregate 
property into zones for residences, farms and businesses.”  Howlett, supra note 155, at 3A.  Thus, 
“freeway porn” has invaded smaller communities, settling in non-exclusionary zones.  Id. 
 302. See GERARD, supra note 235, § 1.02, at 2–4 (discussing the increased attention given to 
regulating adult entertainment and businesses throughout the decades); KELLY & COOPER, supra 
note 171, at 15–22 (discussing the increasing prevalence of sex in the media and entertainment 
throughout the twentieth century). 
 303. See generally Cole, supra note 29 (discussing the issues faced throughout the years 
when trying to regulate sexual expression). 
 304. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 305. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 578–79 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) and protecting the right of homosexual persons to 
engage in private, consensual, sexual activity); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) 
(protecting a woman’s right to choose); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1966) 
(protecting the right to use contraception as a marital privacy right).  In his dissent in Lawrence, 
Justice Antonin Scalia opined that the majority chose to disregard moral judgments as sufficient 
grounds for “criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and 
obscenity” and thus “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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and Fourteenth Amendments.306  But, with every assertion of a fundamental 
right or liberty must come a concomitant understanding that there is a 
coordinate responsibility to exercise that right reasonably.  Determining the 
reasonableness of conduct grounded in these two amendments must be  
fact-sensitive and guided by community standards.307  Broad, open-ended 
moral judgments should be eschewed as foundational bases for legal 
judgments.308  Indeed, advancing moral grounds as a justification for 
regulating personal liberties of sexual expression and association is an invalid 
means of enacting exclusionary land-use regulations, such as the containment 
of activities connected with SOBs.309 
Given contemporary society’s cultural decline and the acceptance of private 
standards of moral conduct as more relevant than an amorphous ideal of public 
morality that safeguards the common good,310 the wiser path for enforcement 
and regulations of SOBs would be for the state and its municipalities to use 
their police powers to regulate public health,311 rather than enforce a standard 
of public morality.  Put simply, threats to public health from the types of 
promiscuous, random, unsafe sexual conduct that may often occur at SOBs can 
be better documented by use of the secondary-effects doctrine during the initial 
licensing phase of the SOB as opposed to attempting to find and prove issues 
of moral misconduct. 
Formulating a bright-line rule to assess when questionable conduct or 
pornographic material rises to the level of obscenity, and thus should be strictly 
censured or regulated, is nearly impossible.312  In trying to either eliminate or 
contain the operation of SOBs, the most logical and common-sense approach is 
for legislators, land-use planners, zoning commissioners, and courts to rely 
upon and use several tools: exclusionary-zoning techniques and common law 
nuisance fortified by either moral, anticipatory, or aesthetic iterations or 
                                                 
 306. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Koppelman, supra note 121, at 908 n.55 
(describing the Supreme Court’s protection of sexual expression under the First Amendment). 
 307. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 40, at 1650 (discussing moral codes as being 
community-specific). 
 308. Id. at 1639. 
 309. WING ET AL., supra note 170. 
 310. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND 
AMERICAN DECLINE 1–4 (1996). 
 311. See PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 99, 113–14 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2d ed. 
2010). 
 312. George P. Smith II, Nudity, Obscenity and Pornography: The Streetcars Named Lust 
and Desire, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 155, 189 (1988) [hereinafter Smith, Nudity, 
Obscenity and Pornography].  The level at which pornography becomes hard-core and obscene, 
and “utterly without redeeming social importance” is as elusive today as it was in 1964 in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio.  378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)).  In a concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart opined that, although he could not define, 
intelligibly, when pornography became hard core and thus obscene, he nevertheless “kn[e]w it 
when [he] s[aw] it.”  Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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models.313  Although it is difficult to determine when, under nuisance law, 
conduct is so unreasonable as to warrant its cessation, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts314 provides a workable construct for making that 
determination.  Both strengthened and guided by the doctrine of secondary 
effects, nuisance actions of all types serve as an additional tool in the arsenal of 
legal weapons that may be used to regulate effectively SOBs.  
Through either dispersal or concentration of SOBs, the practical effect of 
these models of exclusionary zoning is simply to push their location to other 
areas within a community or its neighboring regions.315  When strict licensing 
standards for initial start-up business operations are introduced as part of a 
land-use policy for regulating SOBs, however, a stronger, balanced response is 
achieved.316 
CONCLUSION 
The implementation of a community-based standard of morality for proper 
regulatory control of SOBs will always present an issue of unpredictability 
inherent in its underlying flexibility.317  For the content-neutral regulation of 
sexually oriented businesses, the only limiting requirement analyzed, aside 
from ensuring adequate alternative channels of communication, is whether the 
regulation serves a significant government interest.318  Further, although the 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that preventing a multitude of secondary 
effects is a significant government interest, the manner in which that goal 
could be served has not been meaningfully defined or limited. 
The secondary-effects doctrine places great power, and corresponding 
responsibility, in the hands of each local community, but it does so at the peril 
of uniformity.  Although uniformity is not an absolute necessity in the 
federalist system, the type and severity of secondary effects that may serve as a 
justification for regulating the location of a sexually oriented business should 
be clarified.  The time, place, or manner restrictions imposed can be left up to 
each locality to tailor to their needs, but the triggering events for those 
restrictions must be defined more clearly. 
                                                 
 313. Daniel J. McDonald, Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses: The Regulatory 
Uncertainties of a “Regime of Prohibition by Indirection” and the Obscenity Doctrine’s 
Communal Solution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 339, 341–42 (1997). 
 314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828 (1979). 
 315. See GARNETT, supra note 113, at 1103, 1108. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 188–91. 
 317. See Smith, Nudity, Obscenity and Pornography, supra note 312, at 187–89 (discussing 
the inability to concretely define moral perceptions, specifically with regard to obscenity); see 
also Pettys, supra note 76, at 1215 (observing that “perpetual moral conflict is simply inevitable” 
because the lines between normative standards for public and private morality are largely 
ephemeral in today’s society and, thus, subject to conflict at judicial, legislative, and regulatory 
levels of government). 
 318. See supra text accompanying note 249. 
